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1 Introduction
We start by reviewing the complicated situation in methods of scientific attribution of
climate change to extreme weather events. We emphasize the social values involved
in using both so-called “storyline” and ordinary probabilistic or “risk-based” methods,
noting that one important virtue claimed by the storyline approach is that it features a
reduction in false negative results, which has much social and ethical merit, according
to its advocates. This merit is critiqued by the probabilistic, risk-based, opponents,
who claim the high ground; the usual probabilistic approach is claimed to be more
objective and more “scientific”, under the grounds that it reduces false positive error.
We examine this mostly-implicit debate about error, which apparently mirrors the old
Jeffrey-Rudner debate. We also argue that there is an overlooked component to the
role of values in science: that of second-order inductive risk, and that it makes the
relative role of values in the two methods different from what it first appears to be. In
fact, neither method helps us to escape social values, and be more scientifically “objec-
tive” in the sense of being removed or detached from human values and interests. The
probabilistic approach does not succeed in doing so, contrary to the claims of its pro-
ponents. This is important to understand, because neither method is, fundamentally,
a successful strategy for climate scientists to avoid making value judgments.
2 The Risk-based approach
Within climate science, the field of Detection and Attribution (D&A) concerns the de-
tection of anthropogenic effects on climate. The attribution part concerns how much
or how severe these effects are, that is, how many degrees of temperature, how much
extra precipitation or wind or hurricane force, is due to the increase in the presence
of anthropogenic “forcing”, which is what climate scientists call causal forces on the
climate system, generally. D&A is usually done pertaining to either long term trends
or to extreme weather events, the latter of which is our topic. In other words, to what
extent is a given extreme event or pattern of extreme events attributable to the increase in
greenhouse gases? Clearly, this is a driving question of the day, especially as it relates
to local droughts, floods, and storms.
The methods used to attribute extreme events were first developed and applied in
2003 and 4, in England, by climate scientists at Oxford and the Met Office, specifically
Peter Stott, Scientific Strategic Head for the Climate Monitoring and Attribution group
at the U.K.’s Hadley Centre in Exeter, part of the Met Office, and Myles Allen and
Friederike Otto and their colleagues at Oxford, at the Environmental Change Institute.
They developed the probabilistic technique for attributing climate change to extreme
events. This is the now-conventional technique for attributing climate change to ex-
treme events. It involves examining the event as one in a class of rare extreme weather
or climate events , and using climate models to compare the probability of the extreme
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event under current factual conditions, represented as (p1), with its probability under
counterfactual conditions, represented as (p0), in which the climate, contrary to fact,
did not undergo greenhouse warming and anthropogenic changes in general. The rel-
evant probabilities are arrived at through studying climate models as well as empirical
data. In this risk based approach, the primary objective is to estimate probabilities and
related diagnostics such as the
Fraction of Attributable Risk : FAR = 1− p0/p1
and the
Risk Ratio : (RR = p1/p0)
We can clarify this approach as asking the specific research question: “what is the
probability of a specific class of weather event, given our world with global climate
change, relative to a world without global climate change”
3 The Story-line approach
In a set of recent papers, Kevin Trenberth (2011; 2012) and his co-authors, John Fa-
sullo, and Theodore Shepherd (Shepherd, 2016, 2018, 2019; Shepherd et al., 2018;
Trenberth et al., 2015), as well as the unrelated group Alexis Hannart and colleagues
(Hannart et al., 2016a,b) argued that climate scientists’ approach to D&A studies
should include a set of additional, complementary methods. Shepherd (2016) con-
trasts the now conventional “risk-based approach” with what he dubbed a “storyline”
approach that seeks to explain the origins of singular events and the influence of cli-
mate change and other causes on those events. He describes the “storyline” approach
as “analogous to accident investigation (where multiple contributing factors are gen-
erally involved and their roles are assessed in a conditional manner)”(Shepherd, 2016,
p.32). This conditioned approach is very general, and can occur at a variety of lev-
els, as Shepherd emphasized. A framework of singular causal events such as that
proposed by Cartwright (2017) could be used to formally represent a storyline ap-
proach. According to Shepherd, “The most useful level of conditioning will depend
on the question being asked.” A storyline is a physically self-consistent unfolding of
past events, or of plausible future events or pathways. There is no a priori probabil-
ity of the storyline assessed. Instead, the emphasis is on understanding the driving
factors involved, and the plausibility of those factors, such as anthropogenic forcings.
To illustrate the conditioned, storyline approach, (Trenberth et al., 2015) divide the
representation of climate changes into two types.
1. The dynamics of the atmosphere. This includes such elements as large scale
motions, like cyclonic storms or changes in the jet stream, are responsible for
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the placement of a given weather event at a given time; The problems are that
these are often difficult to discern, and anthropogenic changes in the dynamics
are often small, and therefore hard to attribute (Shepherd, 2014). Shepherd
(2014) was very critical of the accuracy of dynamics portions of climate models,
and many agree with him.
2. Thermodynamic changes. Thermodynamic changes. This includes changes in
heat and its effect on moisture content, for example, and are easier to analyze
and attribute.
Our understanding of the latter is based on such elements as the basic physical law,
the Clausius-Clapeyron relation, that tells us that as the air gets warmer, it will hold
more moisture, (7% more water for each degree Celsius), which means that there can
be more rain from the storm that is developing. This is an important relation that
comes up with regard to hurricanes (Shepherd, 2016; Trenberth et al., 2015). The
warmer the sea water is, the more water the hurricane holds. We saw Kevin Trenberth
on TV news (MSNBC—in Houston while Harvey was happening.) commenting on the
expected floods in Texas based on this physical relation.
For a given severe weather event, the storyline advocates suggest, given a case where
we do not have a physically credible model that includes the dynamics, then “under
such conditions,” it is better for event attribution to focus on thermodynamics of the
event (Trenberth et al., 2015, p.729; Shepherd, 2016, p703). In such cases, we should
often set aside the question whether climate change altered atmospheric dynamics
to make the storm type more likely, for the moment. Instead, the idea is: take the
extreme event as a given constraint and ask if thermodynamic factors are involved in
such a way as to worsen it.
In essence, they are proposing a conditional format: Given the atmospheric dynamics
that brought about the event, how did climate change alter its impacts?
4 Constrasts between the two approaches.
To understand the differences between the two approaches, we like to utilize a frame-
work called the “logic of research questions,” which focuses on consideration of the re-
search questions and their possible responsive and appropriate answers (Lloyd, 2015),
as we have already hinted. This includes consideration of the relations between the
research questions and their possible responsive and appropriate answers, as we’ve
already hinted. Consider the following two examples of a story-line-based, and a risk-
based research question, respectively (see Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018):
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Box 1: Research Question (Storyline)
“Given the Boulder, CO flood of 2013, How did climate change affect
the severity of the flood, all other things being equal?”
Possible and responsive answers:
• It made more water available to the storm (e.g. through Clau-
sius/Clapyron relation) Making the flooding more severe
• It made the storm less severe
• There was no effect of climate change on the severity of the
storm (Trenberth et al. 2015)
Note that this research question assumes that the Boulder Flood occurred when and
where it did, and also assumes all the climate and weather dynamics associated with
its occurrence. In other words, the research question simply assumes these facts, the
causes of which are frequently unknown (Shepherd, 2014). The question is simply
and narrowly the thermodynamic contribution of climate change and other causes to
the severity of the event. On Trenberth et al.’s suggested account, climate change led
to increased water in the air, which was funneled into the Boulder Flood from the
south, thus increasing the amount of rainfall, and thus the severity of the flood itself
(Trenberth et al., 2015). That is a typical answer to a storyline-style extreme event
question; it concerns the single event and some of its causes, including climate change
and thermodynamics, in the absence of adequate dynamical modeling.
Box 2: Research Question (Risk-based)
“What is the probability or risk of a specific class of event, given our
world with global climate change relative to a world without such
change?”
Possible and responsive answers:
• The risk of this type/class of extreme events will increase be-
cause of climate change
• The risk of this type/class of extreme events will decrease be-
cause of climate change
• The risk of this type/class of extreme events will be unaffected
by climate change
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This is a very different research question than the above. It consists in asking, “what is
the probability or risk of a specific class of weather event, given our world with global
climate change, relative to a world without such change?” This question anticipates
different possible answers than the question above. All of the possible answers in box
2 involve classes or types of events, rather than singular events, but this logical fact is
often forgotten by the users of the risk-based method, who tend also to phrase their
answers in terms of singular events (e.g. Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018; Shepherd, 2016,
p.32; Stott, 2016; Stott et al., 2017, abstract)
5 When the approaches compete
The Boulder Flood of 2013 was a paradigmatic case of an apparent conflict between
the two approaches and the two styles of research question. On the one hand we
had Martin Hoerling of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, a
meteorologist who was responsible for the first study on the Boulder Flood of 2013.
He and his colleagues concluded there was no effect from global warming. If anything,
they said, climate change may have made the Boulder event less likely (Hoerling et al.,
2015).
Trenberth et al.(2015), on the hand, concluded that human effects did have an impact
on the storm results. This confirms the point stressed by the National Academy of
Sciences. They said that the approach and framing of an attribution study —in our
terms, the logic of research questions—may affect its conclusions.
6 Controversy
Trenberth had informally suggested a Bayesian conditional approach in 2011. And
in the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, the authors of the Working Group II D&A
chapter mention the potential utility of the Bayesian approach, noting “uncertainties
may in some cases be further reduced if prior expectations about attribution results
themselves are incorporated, using a Bayesian approach to attribution, but this [is]
not currently the usual practice” (Cramer et al., 2014).
In a paper in Climatic Change with Michael Mann as the lead author, Elisabeth Lloyd
and Naomi Oreskes presented an argument for the proof of concept for a conditional
Bayesian approach to D&A (Mann, Lloyd, and Oreskes, 2017). This suggestion was
thought so controversial by this leading journal in climate theory that they commis-
sioned Peter Stott, and his colleagues David Karoly, and Francis Zwiers to write a
rebuttal and commentary (Stott et al., 2017). Their commentary does not address a
primary issue of ours, which was one of values; we shall address their critique itself in
a moment.
6
What we would to note here, is that work on the storyline approach generated a great
deal of controversy (Allen, 2011; Eden et al., 2016; Masters, 2018; McSweeney, 2015;
of Sciences and Medicine, 2016; Stott et al., 2013, 2016, 2017; Tollefson, 2015). Why
was the proposition to pose and answer different research questions in the science
of climate detection and attribution so controversial? Why have scientists reacted so
heatedly? We will not address or repeat the more value-laden or personal attacks here.
In general, one might expect that community to acknowledge that Trenberth, Shep-
herd, and colleagues have raised some serious and significant questions and proposals
with their new methodology. At minimum, one might have expected a discussion ad-
dressing the pros and cons of changing default assumptions, and/or of the feasibility
of replacing conventional approaches with conditional ones.
This is not the primary thing that happened. While some scientists responded posi-
tively, the dominant response of scientists within the DA community has been strongly
negative. Substantive discussions of DA opposed to Trenberth and Shepherd have been
offered by a group led by Peter Stott, at the Met Office in the UK, as well as Gabriele
Hegerl and Francis Zwiers (2011), and Friederike Otto, Myles Allen, and colleagues
(2016), leaders in D&A studies at Oxford. Most centrally—and this appears to be their
most forceful objection—these scientists criticize the storyline account suggestion to
focus on the thermodynamic aspects of climate change, on the grounds that this would
give an incomplete and potentially misleading picture:
While climate models appear to capture thermodynamic changes well, they
may struggle to simulate circulation changes. . . in light of these difficul-
ties, it could be decided to ignore dynamical changes and concentrate in-
stead on how human-induced thermodynamic change have affected ex-
tremes. . . However, many event attribution studies consider how the prob-
ability of an event is changing. This forces consideration of both dynamical
and thermodynamic influences because both can play a role in the chang-
ing probability of an event”(Stott et al., 2016)
These authors stress that dynamical effects can work in both directions—potentially
making certain kinds of events less likely—so one cannot simply set them aside.
7 Analysis of the controversy
To review the objections given in Lloyd and Oreskes (2018), while these considerations
certainly must be taken seriously, there are concerns one might have about the empir-
ical status of the assumption that the counter-examples that they muster are theselves
in good standing. This is precisely the assumption about the dynamics we argued can
be called into question. Logically, we must consider the following facts. First, the
storyline approach is proposed to be applied when we do not know or do not have con-
fidence in the dynamical effects. The issues is not one of “ignoring” them; rather, they
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are not available or adequate in these cases.(Trenberth et al., 2015, p.729; Shepherd,
2016, p703). The challenge from Trenberth et al., Shepherd, and colleagues, however,
was whether these dynamics are at all plausible or reliable; That is the point of argu-
ing that we should rely more heavily on thermodynamical modeling. Thus: the claim
that there are several dynamical models that go against direction of thermodynamics
model, ignores the objection that many dynamical models are inadequate. So offering
these dynamical models as counterexamples ignores the basic objections that discredit
many dynamical models as inadequate or not credible.
Moreover, why should we treat these counterexample dynamical models as more ad-
equate than most? This logical situation has remained unnoticed by the climate sci-
entists involved in this argument and debate, on both sides. But it is a simple logical
problem (see Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018). For example, in their critique and rebuttal
solicited to comment on the Mann et al. paper in Climatic Change, in September, Peter
Stott, Karoly, and Zwiers argued that their proposed priors, which allowed for climate
change influence, could be wrong in a given case. They demonstrated the wrongness
of Mann et al.’s priors through listing a series of four modeling efforts of cases in which
the dynamics of the situation went in opposition to the thermodynamics, a situation
logically identical to the argument we have just been discussing. They wrote:
Given that changes locally can be very different to global expectations, as
a result for example of dynamically induced changes over-coming thermo-
dynamically induced ones, great care must be taken in using prior expec-
tations derived from global considerations.(Stott et al., 2017, p.149)
Again, this argument has the same problematic logic as we’ve just been describing. If
there are likely to be issues with dynamical modeling—and there are —then citing four
dynamical modeling cases as counterexamples to the correctness of thermodynamic
inferences is begging the question, that is, it assumes what needs to be shown. Yet
they want a very strong conclusion:
. . . such prior expectations [regarding the effects of thermodynamics] might
lead to an inappropriate rejection of the alternative null hypothesis pro-
posed by Mann, Lloyd, and Oreskes (2017), namely that there is an an-
thropogenic influence on the event in question. (Stott et al., 2017, p.148).
Look, moreover, at what happens here:
However, many event attribution studies consider how the probability of an
event is changing. This forces consideration of both dynamical and thermo-
dynamic influences because both can play a role in the changing probability
of an event. (Stott et al., 2016)
In this block quote, Stott et al. (2016) seem to be focusing on the question of the prob-
ability of the event, that is, asking the research question: “what is the probability of a
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specific class of weather event, given our world with global climate change, relative to
a world without such change?”
But this is not the focus of storyline approaches, which ask and answer a different type
of research question, more specifically, what is the detailed “autopsy” of the extreme
event and its causes? The question concerning the probability of the type or class of
event itself and how it might have changed from climate change, is a different agenda.
Thus, when Stott et al. object that dynamics can play a role in the changing probabil-
ity of an event, they are simply reiterating their preferred research question regarding
risk. This is an inappropriate objection, given the independent validity of the storyline
approach (see discussion in Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018). Either storyline accounts are
legitimate or they are not, without getting into issues of risk or probabilities. People
want to know what the causes are for their particular storms and floods and droughts,
and indeed, hurricanes and wildfires. Thus, they are invested in storyline accounts or
autopsies. Yet the risk-based research question is often taken to be more important,
more legitimate, or useful than the research questions asked in the storyline approach
(e.g. Eden et al., 2016). The storyline approach omits the dynamics when they are
not available; if they are, then researchers are free to perform either the risk-based or
storyline analyses, or both, as complementary approaches.
The storyline approach is interested in looking at the problem of the causation of an
extreme event from a different angle, or using distinct tools. This may seem to be a
rejection of the type of modeling that Stott et al. do, but it should be seen not as a
rejection but as complementary to their D&A modeling and projects. We think that
further progress could be made by the D&A community if the two approaches were
accepted as complementary and usable in distinct contexts, as appropriate.
To be sure, Shepherd frames a serious problem with the type of preferred errors that
appears using the risk-based approach, writing that if
an extreme event was caused in part by extreme dynamical conditions,
then any risk based analysis using a climate model also has to address the
question of whether the simulated change in the likelihood or severity of
such conditions is credible. . . And if plausible uncertainties are placed on
those changes, then the result is likely to be ‘no effect detected’. . . But
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” (2016, p. 32).
8 Inductive risk.
Philosophers of science familiar with the literature on inductive risk1 will immediately
recognize what is going on here. Shepherd is concerned that the risk-based approach
will falsely fail to attribute the extreme event to climate change. He is concerned that
1See (Rudner, 1953) (Douglas, 2009) and references therein.
9
approach has a propensity to underestimate harm. (See also (Anderegg et al., 2014)
and (Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018))
And this brings us to an arguably very important point, which is that the risk-based
folks are concerned about the opposite kind of error. They are concerned about the risk
of overstatement of human effects-– which is the kind of error risked by the storyline
account. The risk of over-detection is perceived by the D&A community of scientists
to be worse than understatement risked by the their own account. Stott et al, for
example, write
By always finding a role for human-induced effects, attribution assessments
that only consider thermodynamics could overstate the role of anthro-
pogenic climate change, when its role may be small in comparison with
that of natural variability, and do not say anything about how the risk of
such events has changed (2016, p.33).
Note the concern about making too many false positive errors, or overstating the role
of climate change. And here again, we can see the imposition of the risk-based research
question, when Stott et al. insist at the end of this quote that an analysis must say
something about the changing risk of such events. That is the same as insisting on
taking a probabilistic approach, since the storyline approach does not calculate risk
ratios and so on.
Stott and colleagues stress that “mistakenly attributing an increased risk of an extreme
event to climate change could. . . lead to poor adaptation decisions;” time and money
might be spent preparing for events that will not occur. They also warn against the
“danger of premature attribution” (2013). This is all true, but the argument is asym-
metrical as Lloyd and Oreskes emphasize (2018).
The risk of spending money needlessly or assigning blame prematurely is clearly ar-
ticulated and warned against, but the risk of understating the threat, and therefore
taking insufficient action or failing to hold responsible parties accountable, is not.
Myles Allen takes an importantly asymmetrical approach to error. He suggests that if
the scientific community misses effects that are actually there, thus understating the
harm as a whole, this does
no particular harm to climate scientists as a group. An individual might
miss out on a high-profile paper, but that would be a small price compared
to the reputational harm of claiming a positive result that subsequently
turns out to be false. (Allen, 2011)
The biggest problem here, as Lloyd and Oreskes point out, is: “. . .the argument is
framed in term of risks to scientists and their reputations, but the group most at risk
here is not scientists, but society, or more specifically, members of society who may be
hurt by disruptive climate change and extreme weather events" (Lloyd and Oreskes,
2018, p.7) Although Allen states that false negatives “can still do harm,” that idea is
not pursued. (Lloyd and Oreskes, 2018)
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9 Against Pluralism?
It is worth noting the degree to which these sorts of consideration fail to be decisive.
It is not hard to think of examples where a focus on the thermodynamics of a physical
setup provides better predictive power than a focus on dynamics, but it is also not hard
to think of examples where the dynamics are more determinative. We are unaware of
any good arguments that either approach is intrinsically better–in general and for all
cases.
Indeed, there do not really seem to be well-grounded scientific reasons for preferring
either approach. According to the Logic of Research Questions analysis, the different
methods would be appropriate for answering distinct and different questions, depend-
ing on the interests of the questioner. and the context of the investigation. Under such
circumstance, one might expect participants to at least be tolerant of a plurality of
approaches. But this has not been what we have observed. So what is going on? Some
reflection on some quotations from proponents of both the risk-based and storyline
approaches can shed some light on this.
Mistakenly attributing an increased risk of an extreme event to climate
change could . . . lead to poor adaptation decisions There is a . . . danger of
premature attribution (Stott et al., 2013).
. . . whether the simulated change in the likelihood or severity of such condi-
tions is credible And if plausible uncertainties are placed on those changes,
then the result is likely to be ‘no effect detected’ . . . But absence of evidence
is not evidence of absence. (Shepherd, 2016, p.32).
always finding a role for human-induced effects . . . could overstate the role
of anthropogenic climate change, when its role may be small in comparison
with that of natural variability (Stott et al., 2016, p.33).
In combination, these quotations, alongside the absence of good scientific reasons for
preferring risk-based approaches to storyline approaches, make it clear that opponents
of the storyline approach are primarily motivated by considerations of inductive risk.
10 Climbing the Values Ladder
“Inductive risk” was a term coined by Carl Hempel (1965) to refer to the situation, first
highlighted by Richard Rudner (1953), in which a scientist needs needs to balance the
risk of accepting a false hypothesis against the risk of falsely rejecting a true one. We
can easily formulate Rudner’s lesson using an example from climate science. Should
we, for example, accept or reject the hypothesis that, given future emissions trends, a
certain regional climate outcome will occur? Should we accept the hypothesis, let’s say,
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that a particular glacial lake dam will burst in the next 50 years? Rudner’s point was
that if we accept the hypothesis, we will surely replace the moraine with a concrete
dam, but whether we want to do this will depend both on our degree of evidence for
the hypothesis, but also on how we would measure the severity of the consequences
of building the dam, and having the glacier not melt, vs. not building the dam, and
have the glacier melt.
The situation of inductive risk is: as long as the evidence for a hypothesis is not 100%
conclusive then we cannot accept or reject the hypothesis without balancing the risk
of falsely rejecting the hypothesis against the risk of falsely accepting it. Opponents
of the storyline approach such as Allen and Stott et al. seem to be convinced that
the negative consequences of mistakenly attributing a severe weather event to climate
change when that attribution was not in fact warranted are more serious than the
negative consequences of doing the opposite: mistakenly failing to attribute a severe
weather event to climate change when such an attribution is in fact warranted. Why
do they think this?
It is hard to say for sure what the sum total of reasons they have for reaching this
conclusion about the balance of risks, but one consideration that they seem to weigh
heavily is on behalf of the risks scientists would face regarding their credibility if they
were to mistakenly attribute a severe weather event to climate change.
Mistakenly attributing an increased risk of an extreme event to climate
change could . . . lead to poor adaptation decisions . . . [It poses a] danger
of premature attribution. (Stott, 2013)
Making the opposite kind of mistake, on the other hand, poses
no particular harm to climate scientists as a group. An individual might
miss out on a high-profile paper, but that would be a small price compared
to the reputational harm [faced by the community of climate scientists as a
whole] of claiming a positive result that subsequently turns out to be false.
(Allen 2011).2
But this does not include the sum total of risks. Stott and Allen only seem to be
weighing the risks born by the scientists themselves—the risk of missing out on a
potential discovery versus the risk of harming one’s reputation. But inductive risk
considerations, if they are going to avoid being hopelessly solipsistic, need to also
weigh the risks born by consumers of the scientific findings, and not merely their
producers. In the case of climate science, those principal risks, as everyone knows, are
the risks of being inadequately prepared for, or inadequately mitigating, the increased
damages and lives lost produced by severe weather events, on the one hand, and the
risk of over-preparing or over-mitigating on the other.
2Lloyd and Oreskes (2018) argue that Allen’s claim here is empirically false, that in fact, there is
reputation harm to scientists who fail to predict important events, but that is not crucial to our
argument here.
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As Rudner made clear, when scientists accept or reject claims or hypotheses, they need
to balance the harms to society as a whole, of accepting the hypothesis should it turn
out to be wrong, against the harms, to society as a whole, of rejecting the hypothesis
should it turn out to be true. In short, the principal risks that need to be weighed in
situations of inductive risk are not, first and foremost, the risk born by the scientists
qua scientists. The principal risk are those born by the consumers of the scientists’
findings, which in the case of climate comprises society as a whole.
To be charitable, one would have to assume that Stott and Allen both understand this.
No one could work in a scientific discipline that is as socially and politically fraught as
climate science and continue to be so solipsistic as to believe that only scientists qua
scientists bear inductive risk. So what could we imagine is going on that might explain
the above passages while exhibiting at least this much charity?
To offer a first pass at an answer to this question, it is worth reviewing the response
that Richard Jeffrey (1956) famously authored shortly after Richard Rudner’s work ap-
peared in the early 1950’s. Jeffrey’s famous reply to Rudner was that scientists could
avoid having to weigh inductive risks by simply abstaining from accepting or rejecting
hypotheses. If, said Jeffrey, scientists simply offer estimates of their degrees of belief in
the scientific hypotheses that they evaluate, rather than accepting or rejecting them,
they can avoid having to make value judgements about the balance of risks associ-
ated with acceptance and rejection of hypotheses. If degrees of belief are passed on to
consumers of scientific knowledge, then those consumers can make their own determi-
nations of what actions should be performed, and those determinations can reflect the
consumers’ own values regarding the harms of performing each (potentially) wrong
action.
Looked at in this way, one can see the debate between storyline proponents and risk-
based approaches as more or less straight-forwardly recapitulating the Rudner Jeffrey
debate. The storyline proponents want to make determinate proclamations regard-
ing how much anthropogenic climate change contributed to the damage produced by
this or that severe weather event. The risk-based proponents prefer to offer probabil-
ities. This strategy, they seem to be saying, can help us avoid ‘mucking around’ in the
values.
The upshot of this might seem clear: insofar as you think that Jeffrey’s reply to Rudner
was a cogent one, it appears to follow that the risk-based folks have the correct view
here. Or at least– that the risk-based folks have the view that best approaches the
value-free ideal that Jeffrey defended: scientists should abstain, whenever possible,
from making value-laden balance-of-inductive-risk decisions by offering probabilistic
assessments rather than accepting or rejecting hypotheses. Looked at in this light,
it can appear that the dispute between proponents of story-line approaches and pro-
ponents of risk-based approach is a dispute about whether or not to aim as well as
possible at the value-free ideal of science.
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Is this correct? The answer to this question depends, to a large extent, on the degree
to which one thinks that the value-free ideal is achievable in climate science. The de-
gree to which one can achieve the value-free ideal, in turn, depends on how well one
can assign precise probabilities to climate hypotheses in a value-free way. As has been
argued elsewhere, unfortunately, this is especially difficult in sciences, like climate sci-
ence, that depend on highly complex models constructed by diverse, interdisciplinary
groups. (see Biddle and Winsberg, 2009; Parker and Winsberg, 2018; Winsberg, 2012,
2018) In climate science, it is often difficult to find experts who will offer the precise
credences they they assign to hypotheses. In practice, expert groups like the IPCC of-
ten offer us much coarser depiction of their uncertainty. Ask the IPCC, for example,
whether the net feedback strength of clouds is positive or negative, and they will tell
you that the probability that net cloud feedback strength is positive is 66% or higher,
and that their confidence in this probability claim is “low”. (Stocker et al., 2013)
In one respect, when a group of experts offers us a very coarse representation of their
uncertainty, they are adhering as closely as possible to the value-free ideal. A simple
example can illustrate this. Suppose you are a weather expert, and a client asks you
for your expert opinion about the probability of rain tomorrow. But suppose that,
for whatever reason, you are only confident that the probability of rain is somewhere
between .5 and .75. Suppose, furthermore, that you do not know the utilities that your
client assigns either to getting wet, or to carrying an umbrella to work unnecessarily.
If your client forces you to choose an exact probability of rain, he or she is in effect
forcing you to make a decision on their behalf about the severity of getting wet relative
to the severity of needlessly carrying an umbrella. If you chose .5 as your probability,
you are implicitly assigning low weight to the severity of getting wet. If you chose
.75, you are implicitly assigning it high weight. And any value in between implicitly
assigns it some corresponding middle weight. Thus, refraining from picking a precise
probability, and rather reporting to the client that the probability falls in the range
between .5 and .75 enables you to refrain from having to choose between erring on
the side of high severity or low severity.
In fact, in disciplines like climate science, where precise probability distributions are
hard to arrive at in value free ways, the knowledge expert can choose from a con-
tinuum of possible deliverables. At one end of the spectrum, the expert can declare
hypotheses to be true or false. At the other end of the spectrum, she can report very
coarse probability ranges for the hypotheses she evaluates. And in the middle, of
course, she can report fine-grained probabilities. In one clear respect, this continuum
corresponds, respectively, to a continuum of degrees of meeting the value-free ideal.
By offering a very coarse probability range (say, all the way from .5 to .75) the weather
expert can completely refrain from imposing her values regarding the seriousness of
getting wet and the seriousness of unnecessarily carrying an umbrella, on her client.
Simply telling her client that it will or won’t rain does exactly the opposite. And re-
porting a precise probability of, say, .65, is in the middle. In this respect, it appears as
though the proponents of the risk-based approach have the upper hand: they adhere
more closely to the value-free ideal than the story-line advocates do. Behind all of the
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above quotations from Allen and Stott, we can hear the whisper: ‘you storyline pro-
ponents are getting down and dirty in the values. When you don’t take proper care to
avoid premature attribution, you are advocating on behalf of climate alarmists, rather
than dispassionately reporting what you know.’
This analysis is correct, but it is only half the picture. There is indeed a spectrum one
can travel along, from offering only coarse grained probabilistic forecasts, to making
precise ones, all the way to accepting and rejecting hypotheses. And it is certainly cor-
rect that when scientists stick their necks out, by moving further along that spectrum
toward accepting and rejecting hypothesis, they are moving away from a value-free
ideal: the ideal that the scientists should refrain from imposing their values regarding
whether it is worse to accept a false hypothesis or reject a true one. But it is not true in
general that as scientists move along the spectrum in the opposite direction, they are
thereby abstaining from making value judgements at all. Suppose our weather expert
chooses to give a moderately coarse estimate, informing her clients that the probabil-
ity of rain is “at least 60%”. In so doing, she has made a decision, on behalf of her
client, that the risk he bears by ignoring the possibility that the probability might be
lower than that is insufficiently important. That has to reflect, at least in part, a value
judgment on her part that the harm of needlessly carrying an umbrella is lower than
the one she would have implicitly been making had she communicated, instead, that
the probability was “at least 50%”. By the reasoning of the previous paragraph, she
has not adhered as closely as she could have to the value-free ideal.
But there are values involved here other than the utilities associated with getting wet
and with needlessly carrying an umbrella. Just as you might value staying dry more
than I do, you might value getting a more informative forecast from your experts than
I do, and conversely, I might value getting a forecast from my experts in which they
are maximally confident. And when our expert choses to leave off the probability tail
between 50% and 60%, she has given us a more informative forecast than the one that
includes the whole range . But a fortiriori, this is also a judgment in which she is less
confident. She has favored your values over mine.
If this is right, there is no value-free fulcrum from which to provide expert judgment
when it comes to climate science and expert policy advice related to climate change.
While it is understandable the Allen, Stott, et al are trying to keep from mucking
around in the values, and it is understandable that they view this as a fundamental
norm governing scientific behavior, they are somewhat naive in thinking they are able
to follow it. While it is not incorrect to understand the story-line folks as being engaged
in something akin to advocacy, it is incorrect to understand the opposite stance as
the value-free one. The Allen stance is one that values epistemic confidence over
informativeness, and Shepherd’s stance is the opposite one. But Allen thinks his stance
is in fact objective and value free. It is not. Allen’s value assessment is not shared by
all of the consumers of climate expertise. Many such consumers want to know the
causes of their storm, their flood, their drought, and whether climate change is among
them. And many climate mitigation advocates would like to use information about
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event attribution to raise awareness about the need to take action on the path to
mitigation. If this is right, then it would seem that the ideal situation is one in
which both risk-based and storyline-based approaches are allowed to co-exist,
and where consumers of climate expertise understand the values underpinning the
judgements of their experts.
11 Conclusion
We have reviewed the two most basic approaches to scientific attribution of climate
change to extreme events, the storyline and risk-based or probabilistic methods. Both
engage social values, although the values appealed to by the distinct approaches are
different, as are the types of errors that they seek to avoid. One key strength of the
storyline approach is that it reduces false negative results, an advantage that is claimed
to have ethical and social virtues for the good of society, protecting it against nasty
surprises and unexpectedly severe events. This social protectiveness and informedness
is claimed by the advocates of the risk-based approach to be a vulnerability, leading as
it may to an excess of false positive errors, a traditional scientific vice; this attitude is
one that is frequently taken to indicate greater scientific “objectivity”, or closeness to
representation of independent reality. In reality, however, we should understand the
position of the advocates of the storyline approach as one that places more value on
avoiding “harmful reassurance” than do those who favor the risk-based approach.3
While the two “sides” of this debate about methods do sometimes argue directly about
which is the preferred error, especially in terms of preparedness and informativeness
on the side of the storyline approach, and in terms of overpreparedness on the side of
the risk-based approach, the debate is often indirect and implicit. While the debate in
climate methodology strikingly appears to mirror the old Jeffrey-Rudner debate about
values in philosophy of science, on our analysis, there is a second-order feature to the
debate that has been under-appreciated.
Lloyd (1995) describes one key meaning of scientific objectivity as “detached” or “dis-
interested”: “‘Objective means detached, disinterested, unbiased, impersonal, invested
in no particular point of view (or not having a point of view)”. In 2013, she made a
separate meaning for “unbiased”, in her paper with Vanessa Schweizer, and detached
was more narrowly described as: “disinterested, independent from will or wishes, or
impersonal”, where the will or wishes at stake can be either personal or political.4 But
second-order inductive risk shows that neither method helps us to escape social values,
3The term “harmful reassurance” comes from the literature on how to offer balanced reporting regard-
ing research on chronic traumatic encephalopathy (Casper et al., 2019; Finkel et al., 2019) which
bears some structural similarity to the present topic.
4These are all distinguished from “independently existing”, “Really real”, unbiased, public, procedu-
rally objective, and interactively or structurally objective (having to do with interactions among
participants in producing knowledge; Lloyd and Schweizer, 2014).
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and be more scientifically “objective” in the sense of being removed or detached from
human values and interests. Thus, while the risk-based approach claims to be more
“objective” in the sense of “detached”, we conclude that it cannot actually succeed
in being so, because valuing confidence more than informativeness, as it does, itself
invokes social values of various kinds. Thus, there is a stand-off between the views
concerning the level of social values involved, and choices simply must be made about
which values are to be preferred in particular cases on a case by case basis.
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